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Abstract 
Since Carmines and Stimson’s seminal work, the concept of issue evolution has become a common 
theoretical toolkit to examine and explain polarization around cultural issues and partisan realignment 
in the U.S. However, very few studies outside the U.S. have applied the concept of issue evolution to 
explain electoral change and realignment around new issues at national elections over time. 
Analyzing whether and how Carmines and Stimson’s concept travels to electoral change in a 
multiparty system would provide more theoretical leverage and create empirical knowledge on the 
logic of issue evolution outside the U.S and also whether the logic of electoral change differs from 
U.S-style two party systems. This article applies the issue evolution concept to a multidimensional 
multiparty system using micro-level data from 1971 to 2011 in combination with data on elite-level 
polarization to demonstrate that partisan realignment in Denmark follows an issue evolution process 
with niche parties as main drivers. Moreover, niche party polarization on the new dimension of 
conflict has a stronger effect on vote choice than mainstream party polarization. 
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An Empirical Model of Issue Evolution and Partisan Realignment in a Multiparty System 
 
Introduction 
Since Carmines and Stimson’s seminal work (1986, 1989), the concept of issue evolution has 
become a commonly used theoretical toolkit to examine polarization around cultural issues and 
partisan realignment in the United States. Issue evolution occurs if a highly-salient new issue cross-
cuts the existing party alignment and then, after party elite polarization on the issue, the public 
reorganizes itself around the new cleavage. Political change and polarization in the United States 
since 1964 has followed an issue evolution process, with issues such as abortion, civil rights, race or 
religion leading to profound realignments among American voters (Adams 1997; Carmines and 
Stimson 1986, 1989; Layman 2001; Carmines and Woods 2002; Lindaman and Haidar-Markel 
2002; Carsey and Layman 2006). 
More recently, research has begun to apply the issue evolution concept to political change 
outside the United States (Stevens 2013 for the UK, Raymond and Feltch 2014 for Chile, and 
Stimson et al. 2012 for France). Most studies of issue evolution outside the United States, however, 
have been limited to other two party systems or the effect of Euroscepticism on vote choice in 
European Parliament elections. De Vries and Hobolt show that the impact of Euroscepticism on 
vote choice in European Parliament elections followed an issue evolution process as niche parties 
and losers of previous elections acted as issue entrepreneurs (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hobolt and 
De Vries 2015). Niche parties in particular, such as nationalists, greens or new right parties, induced 
an elite-level polarization on European integration, to which the mass public reacted by rewarding 
the niche parties’ more Eurosceptical platforms. 
Nevertheless, only Stevens’ study provides a real cross-temporal examination of issue 
evolution and realignment using both micro-level data and data on elite polarization outside the 
U.S., which nevertheless excludes the Liberal Democrats and other third parties. Yet, we lack a 
thorough application of the issue evolution concept to a real multiparty system over time, which 
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incorporates both the role of mainstream and new parties in the issue evolution process and their 
effects on voting behaviour and electoral change over time. 
Consequently, this article applies the issue evolution concept to a multidimensional multiparty 
system using micro-level data from Denmark in the period 1971 to 2011 in combination with data 
on elite-level polarization. Denmark represents a European multiparty system, where cultural issues 
such as immigration, law and order, or the environment became more salient at the expense of 
economic issues (Green-Pedersen 2006, 2011; Stubager 2010; Arndt 2016). Furthermore, the 
balance of power has shifted substantially: until 1973, 90 percent of all governments were formed 
by the Social Democrats, while the majority of governments afterwards were formed by the center-
right. In this respect, my contribution is fourfold. I first argue and demonstrate that only niche party 
polarization but not mainstream party polarization on the new dimension of conflict had significant 
effects on vote choice since 1971. Second, and in line with Carmines and Stimson’s (1989) clarity 
and affect argument, I show that issue preferences on the new dimension of conflict had a stronger 
effect on party choice the more salient the new dimension had become on the elite level. Third, this 
effect is considerably stronger for the choice of niche parties than for the choice of mainstream 
parties. Lastly, models of voters’ migration reveal that partisan realignment in Denmark followed 
an issue evolution process, where niche party polarization conditioned the effect of cultural 
conservatism on realigning with a right-wing party. In sum, the key finding is that issue evolution in 
a multiparty system in the sense of Carmines and Stimson is not driven by mainstream competitors, 
but by new and usually niche or challenger parties. 
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Issue Evolution and Partisan Realignment in Multiparty Systems 
Carmines and Stimson (1986, 1989) established the sequence of issue evolution in the United 
States, which starts with elite polarization on a new issue dimension and ends with mass partisan 
realignment. Clarity and affect provide two intervening steps in this causal chain. Clarity means 
that partisans have become aware of the increasing elite polarization on the new dimension. Affect 
means the electorate has reacted to the increasing elite polarization: “The public must not only 
perceive a difference in party issue stands, but must also care about this difference” (Carmines and 
Stimson 1989: 161). If these steps are fulfilled voters’ mass realignment is the ultimate 
consequence.  
Carmines and Stimson’s sequence of issue evolution has been widely applied in explaining 
political change in the U.S. since the nomination of Barry Goldwater as GOP candidate in 1964. 
Various contributions have shown that cultural issues such as civil rights, race or religion have led 
to profound realignments among American voters. After deliberate polarization of new issues by 
political elites, the public showed strong reactions and finally changed party affiliations, shifting the 
balance of power to the benefit of the Republican Party in the post-1968 party system (Adams 1997; 
Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1989; Layman 2001; Lindaman and Haidar-Markel 2002; Carsey and 
Layman 2006). At the same time, Lindaman and Haidar-Markel (2002) identified examples in 
which elite polarization failed to produce an issue evolution due to insufficient reactions at the mass 
level. This relates to the nature of the issue since issues that are ‘easy’, in the sense that voters can 
easily understand their meaning, the elite framing around them, and the conflicting positions, have 
the potential to induce an issue evolution, whereas too technical issues will fail to do so (Carmines 
& Stimson 1989: 11-12; Carmines 1991). 
While Carmines and Stimson developed their theory for a pure two-party system with the 
very rare emergence and success of third parties or independents, an analysis of issue evolution in a 
multiparty system must incorporate more than two parties. The most important difference is the 
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presence of niche (or new) parties who have different incentives to compete and create polarization 
over new issue dimensions.  
The goal here is not to engage in an extensive debate about niche party definition and 
conceptualization. Rather, I follow one crucial defining criterion of niche parties, namely that they 
predominantly compete on a new issue dimension neglected by their mainstream competitors 
(Bischof 2015). This definition concerns green, nationalist, new right, and some radical left parties 
for the purpose of this paper. I further assume in line with Bischof’s (2015: 5) review of the 
literature that niche parties at least in their early phase of existence attempt “to construct novel 
conflict lines from the periphery of party systems on issues with less competition”, and that they in 
contrast to mainstream parties act as first movers. 
In a two-party system, the losing mainstream party has an incentive to compete on new issues, 
especially if it has lost elections consecutively and it is clear that the current alignments within the 
electorate provide a structural disadvantage for the party (Riker 1982; Carmines 1991). It can 
therefore try to expand its electoral base by competing on new issues which potentially divide the 
opponent’s electorate to regain votes and office. This is different under multiparty competition, 
where mainstream parties such as Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Social 
Democrats can still govern as long as their position on the established issue dimension permits 
coalitions with other mainstream parties, provided no party has a structural majority in the 
electorate. 
Competing on a new dimension, however, has two caveats for mainstream parties under 
multiparty competition. First, policy-makers face constraints in turning to new issues after lost 
elections if the traditional dimension of conflict is strongly linked to existing partisan alignments 
(Carmines 1991: 67). This constraint is much stronger for losing mainstream parties since their 
leadership has usually been used to win elections under the traditional issue agenda or tried to win 
elections based on issue avoidance but not issue evolution. Under such circumstances, it is difficult 
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to change the losing mainstream party’s issue agenda by issue entrepreneurs and activists since the 
old elite still might get some benefits by sticking to the traditional issue agenda (Carmines 1991: 
75-76). This constraint is not so vivid for new and niche parties, where issue entrepreneurs and 
activists can easily join and bring forward issues that disrupt the existing alignments. Moreover, the 
party organization can be build up around the new dimension of conflict from the early beginning. 
A related point is that mainstream parties in multiparty systems are generally more risk-averse and 
face stronger external and internal constraints in quickly adapting their strategies and positions to 
new (emerging) issue dimensions (Van de Wardt 2015; Kriesi et al. 2008: 14–18). 
This means that mainstream parties in multiparty systems are confronted with a different 
incentive structure in changing its issue agenda, and we should expect niche parties to be the first 
mover as the latter faces fewer constraints in adapting its agenda (see Bischof 2015). Losing 
mainstream parties and their elites try in this respect first to win office and votes on the traditional 
issue agenda/dimension in the first rounds of competition and then steadily adapt after a niche 
competitor has proven that the new dimension potentially split the winner’s/majority’s electoral 
coalition (Arndt 2016). This further implies that office-seeking on the traditional dimension has 
failed several times and some traditional voters have gone anyway and new voters joined the niche 
party that opened the new dimension of conflict (thus a modified sequence of Carmines’ argument 
on the decay of alignments in the U.S.). Moreover, losing mainstream parties in two-party systems 
can try to split the opponent’s electoral coalition, and only face a non-voter tradeoff if they do, 
while opening a new dimension of competition by a mainstream party under multiparty competition 
yields less clear payoffs in the beginning. In the worst case, such a strategy could create niches for 
new competitors or increase the electoral potential of already existent niche party competitors who 
benefit from the increasing salience of their issues, while the electoral benefits for the mainstream 
party remain unclear in the first place. 
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Second, and a by-product of the first constraint, a mainstream party can endanger its coalition 
potential under multiparty competition in the beginning if the new dimension represents a wedge 
issue with other established parties, irrespective of whether the new dimension might be electorally 
beneficial for the mainstream party (see Van de Wardt et al. 2014). Accordingly, issue polarization 
is induced by niche parties who usually have vote-seeking as their primary goal in the early phase 
of their existence and not coalition formation with established parties. Therefore, niche parties seek 
to exploit a first-mover advantage to establish a core constituency, which the established 
mainstream parties already have (Meyer and Wagner 2013; Bischof 2015). 
In sum, mainstream parties in multiparty systems have different incentives to engage in issue 
evolution compared to their counterparts in two-party systems and are expected to lag behind niche 
parties which have a higher likelihood of acting as issue entrepreneurs. Niche parties therefore start 
the issue evolution sequence in multiparty systems, which is a crucial difference from the case of 
two-party systems. Empirical analyses of elite and mass polarization and issue salience have shown 
that this is indeed the case for the elite positioning and clarity part of the issue evolution sequence 
(Van de Wardt 2015; Arndt 2016).  
We can further apply this logic to the electoral effects of issue evolution driven by niche 
parties in multiparty systems. If niche party positioning accounts for clarity on the new dimension, 
then it should also account for affect and mass alignment which means that a realignment has 
occurred after the electorate has become aware of and reacted to the increasing elite polarization 
induced by niche parties. Since “the new issue emerges as the leading possibility for making the 
voting decision” (Stimson 2004: 67), we should expect voters to react to those actors who have 
introduced and keep to emphasize the new issue dimension in a multiparty system. Consequently, 
niche party polarization should be a stronger predictor of mass realignment than mainstream party 
polarization in the first step. 
I therefore expect that:  
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H1: Only niche party polarization but not mainstream party polarization on the new dimension of 
conflict has significant effects on vote choice. 
Following the qualification that elite polarization does not always automatically lead to issue 
evolution and realignment, (Carmines 1991; Carmines and Stimson 1989: 161; Carmines & Woods 
2002; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002: 105-106), we also need to account for issue salience as 
moderator. Carmines and Stimson 1989: 161) argued that the issue needs strong emotional response 
among the mass after elite polarization has become clear (‘clarity’). In other words, when parties 
adopt more diverging positions, the salience of the issue increases among both the elite and the 
mass, and voters eventually evaluate parties more along those lines (‘affect’). The changing issue 
agenda means that voters base their decisions less on the traditional dimension of conflict – even if 
they might keep the respective issue preferences – and now increasingly employ their preferences 
on the new dimension in assessing parties, which then “alters the fundamental link between citizen 
and party” (Carmines 1991: 74).  
Accordingly, issue evolution only occurs if the new dimension of conflict has enough salience 
to condition the effects of the voters’ attitudes on their vote choice, which means that niche party 
polarization is necessary but not sufficient. This means that salience of the new dimension of 
conflict moderates the electoral impact of the voters’ attitudes on the new dimension of conflict – 
implying an interactive relationship (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Druckman et al. 2013; 
Levendusky 2010). Since political parties usually act as opinion leader in this sequence, I assume 
that changes in elite salience antecede changes in mass salience (Stimson 2004; see Arndt 2016 for 
a respective test with Danish data) and will therefore rely on elite salience as moderator variable 
below. Since the new dimension of vote choice is introduced by niche parties in multiparty systems, 
I formulate the following two conditional hypotheses: 
H2: Issue attitudes on the new dimension of conflict among the voters have a stronger effect on party 
choice the more salient the new dimension has become on the elite level. 
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H3: Issue attitudes on the new dimension of conflict matter more for the choice of niche parties than 
for the choice of mainstream parties. 
Finally, to substantiate that issue evolution has contributed to electoral change in the Danish 
multiparty system, I inspect whether partisan realignment is a function of elite polarization on a new 
dimension of conflict. For an issue evolution-driven partisan realignment, we need to observe that 
polarization conditions the effects of issue preferences, i.e. stronger effects of issue preferences on 
the new dimension the more parties polarize. In other words, voters should increasingly realign their 
party choice in line with their issue positions the more polarized this dimension has become. Thus, 
partisan sorting in the sense of Carmines and Stimson (1989: esp. 167) and Carsey and Layman 
(2006) should be contingent on niche party polarization in the Danish multiparty system. 
H4: The realignment of voters from the left to the right on the new dimension of conflict follows an 
issue evolution process induced by niche parties. 
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Case selection and background 
Denmark is an ideal test case for applying Carmines and Stimson’s concept of issue evolution to the 
analysis of partisan realignments in a multiparty system. Denmark has consistently had parliaments 
with at least five parties represented since the introduction of unicameralism in 1953. The Social 
Democrats had been dominant until 1973, forming all but one government between 1953 and 1973. 
Afterwards, the center-right bloc formed more than half of all governments, which signals a change 
in the balance of power akin to the post-1964 U.S. party system. The Social Democrats’ main 
opponent for most of the postwar period was the Liberal Party Venstre, a center-right party that 
traditionally adhered to market liberalism. In the 1990s, the Liberals adopted a more conservative 
platform on cultural issues and replaced the Social Democrats as the largest party from 2001 to 
2011 (Mortensen 2008). These two parties are treated as mainstream parties in the analysis as they 
have competed for the Prime Ministership for most of the period since 1920.1 
As for niche parties, the Socialist People’s Party (SF, hereafter) made its breakthrough in the 
1960s. It was originally an economically leftist workers’ party, but eventually adopted a liberal 
platform on the environment, immigration, law enforcement, women’s rights and other cultural 
issues. It did not join governments until 2011 but has been consistently represented in parliament 
since 1960, and always supported governments formed by the Social Democrats. This party is used 
as the main case for a leftist and culturally liberal niche party below because other, smaller radical 
left or liberal parties were either not permanently represented, split from or merged with other 
parties, or, in the case of the Social Liberal party (Radikale Venstre), occasionally cooperated with 
the center-right Liberals and Conservatives. The Social Liberals are used as a supplementary case 
(results reported in the Online Appendix, Figures A5-A7) since its political positioning on the new 
dimension examined here often matches that of the SF (see Arndt 2016). 
In 1973, Danish politics was shocked by the so-called earthquake elections, with the number 
of parties doubling to ten and the emergence of new, mostly, niche parties. For the purpose of this 
12 
paper, the Progress Party (Fremskridtsparti) is the most important new party on the right. In the 
1970s, it espoused a right-wing libertarian anti-state and anti-government intervention platform. 
However, an immigration law passed in 1983 was regarded at the time as one of the world’s most 
liberal, and Denmark quickly saw rising immigration from non-Western countries (Goul Andersen 
2004; Hansen 2016). This marks a critical moment in Danish political history. The Progress Party 
and later its successor, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, together referred to in tables 
below as the New Right), focused increasingly on restrictive stances on immigration and tough law-
and-order policies as a response to this sea change in Danish immigration policy, and after the 
party’s anti-government intervention policies lost ground among Danish voters (Brøcker 1990). The 
party elite, led by its founder Mogens Glistrup and then-chairman Pia Kjærsgaard, realized the 
electoral potential of the immigration issue and started to realign the Progress Party’s electoral 
platform and strategy (Kjærsgaard 2013: 60-65; Nielsen 2013: 185). This was eventually rewarded, 
and the Progress Party had halted its electoral decline by the late 1980s. Its successor, the Danish 
People’s Party, has established itself as Denmark’s third-largest party since 2000. Consequently, 
this party should be an important driver in the process of issue evolution in Denmark, and its 
distance from the SF on cultural issues captures elite polarization on a new dimension of conflict 
(see Arndt 2016). 
To show that the Danish political elite increasingly competed on cultural issues after 1973, I 
used Danish Policy Agenda Project data on the Danish parliamentary agenda for the legislative 
periods from 1968 to 2011 (Green-Pedersen 2006, 2007, 2011). Following the method of various 
U.S.-based studies that use roll call data from Congress to assess the salience of issues among party 
elites (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989: 169ff; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002), I recoded 236 
sub-issues into three categories: economic issues, cultural issues, and all other issues (see Online 
Appendix for coding). To gauge the prevailing issue agenda, I subtracted the share of cultural issues 
from the share of economic issues for all parliamentary activities in each electoral period examined. 
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Positive values indicate that economic issues such as government intervention or unemployment 
were more salient among Danish political elites, while negative values indicate that cultural issues 
such as crime or immigration were more salient. As the Danish parliamentary system is unicameral 
and no strong regional parliaments exist, it is reasonable to assume that this procedure captures the 
elite agenda quite well. 
Figure 1 reveals that the elite agenda in Denmark has shifted considerably. Until the electoral 
term 1981-1984, economic issues were always more salient than cultural issues, as illustrated by the 
exclusively positive values. Beginning with the electoral term 1981-1984, however, in which the 
immigration law was passed, the salience of economic issues crumbles and cultural issues become 
more salient, becoming the dominant dimension of political competition. This development can also 
be seen when using the voters’ agenda (see Figure A1 in online appendix). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Having demonstrated the changing elite agenda in Figure 1 and thus elite salience in Denmark 
after 1968, the next step is to demonstrate elite (de-)polarization on the two dimensions. I used the 
Comparative Manifesto Project and calculated the positions of the two mainstream parties (Social 
Democrats and Liberals) and the three niche parties that were consistently represented in the Danish 
parliament from 1973 (Progress Party/Danish People’s Party, Socialist People’s Party and Social 
Liberals) on economic and cultural issues. I followed Bakker and Hobolt’s (2013) coding of the 
Comparative Manifesto Project data for polarization in two-dimensional party systems (Volkens et 
al. 2013).2 The economic dimension distinguishes pro-state and pro-government intervention from 
free-market and anti-government intervention positions, where higher values indicate the latter. The 
cultural dimension distinguishes cultural liberalism from cultural conservatism, again with higher 
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values indicating a more right-wing or conservative position (see Online Appendix for detailed 
coding). The results appear in Figure 2 and 3. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 2 depicts the five parties’ positions on economic issues since the electoral term 1968-
1971. Until 1984, party polarization on economics was strong, with the Progress Party as the 
advocate of free market economics and the Socialist People’s Party as its antipode. The two 
mainstream parties represented moderate pro-market (Liberals) and moderate pro-state (Social 
Democrats) platforms, with the Social Liberals falling in between for most years. Elite polarization 
on the economy then diminished after the electoral term 1981-1984 as the parties began to converge 
on the state-market dimension. After the turn of the millennium, four out of five parties took centrist 
to moderately pro-state intervention positions, and the ideological distances between the two most 
extreme niche parties (the Progress Party/Danish People’s Party and the Socialist People’s Party) 
declined from more than 80 points (late ‘70s) to around 30 points by 2000.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Figure 3 reveals an opposite pattern of elite polarization on cultural issues. Until 1984, there 
was no substantial polarization on cultural issues between the five parties under review. Only the SF 
adopted a culturally liberal platform from the beginning, while all other parties had moderate 
positions close to zero (with the exception of the Liberals in 1979). The Progress Party also did not 
have a clear standpoint on the cultural dimension in the early years. This picture changed with the 
electoral term 1981-1984 and the immigration law. Afterwards, especially the Progress Party (and 
later Danish People’s Party), began to take clear positions. Taken as a whole, we can see growing 
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ideological distances, with the New Right increasingly taking culturally conservative positions and 
the Socialist People’s Party and the Social Liberals taking culturally liberal positions. The 
mainstream parties polarized less on cultural issues, although there is a tendency for the Liberals 
and Social Democrats to take more distinct positions on cultural issues after 1984 than before.3 
These illustrations of elite salience and elite polarization clearly show that Danish politics has 
become two-dimensional since 1973 and that polarization around cultural issues has replaced 
polarization around economics as the major cleavage. Niche parties polarized more strongly on the 
new dimension of conflict, which confirms the expectation that issue evolution is driven by niche 
parties rather than mainstream parties.4 The next step is to investigate whether this elite polarization 
had effects on general Danish voting behavior and to test the respective hypotheses on the role of 
niche parties in realignment. First, I briefly introduce the data and measures used. 
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Data 
To examine how elite polarization in Denmark has affected vote choice, and to inspect whether 
realignment was the final product of issue evolution in Denmark, I pooled the Danish National 
Election Studies 1971-2011 (DNES) and merged them with the CMP data and the Danish Policy 
Agenda Project to capture elite salience and polarization over time.5 The dependent variable to test 
the first two hypotheses is vote choice, where I used four party contrasts: 1) Social Democrats vs. 
Liberals, 2) Social Democrats vs. New Right, 3) Liberals vs. SF, and 4) SF vs. New Right. If my 
hypotheses are right, then the we should observe the strongest effects for the niche party contrast SF 
vs. New Right and the weakest for the mainstream contrast Social Democrats vs. Liberals. For the 
fourth hypothesis, I constructed two measures on voter migration based on the vote choice in the 
current election and the vote choice at the last parliamentary election (based on the vote recall 
question). These measures are explained in detail below. One main reason to use actual vote choice 
to capture partisanship is that the DNES do not contain a party identification variable in all years as 
common in American studies. The main independent variables in the analysis are elite polarization 
and elite salience of economic issues and cultural issues. To construct measures for mainstream 
versus niche party polarization, I took the parties’ positions on the two dimensions as depicted in 
Figures 2 and 3. I then subtracted the Social Democrats’ from the Liberals’ positions to obtain 
mainstream party polarization and subtracted the Socialist People’s Party’s positions from the New 
Right’s positions on both dimensions to obtain niche party polarization. The use of these contrasts 
to capture polarization in a multiparty system has been validated by Arndt (2016) and mirrors the 
‘Sartori measure’ that captures polarization between the most viable left and right party on a given 
issue dimension (e.g., Crepaz 1990). For elite issue salience, I used the share of economic and 
cultural issues of all parliamentary activities for each election term before the respective elections to 
capture that elite salience antecedes mass reaction. 
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To test my hypotheses that issue attitudes on the new dimension of conflict have a stronger 
effect on party choice the more polarized and the more salient the new dimension has become, I 
used six items measuring attitudes towards economic inequality, the free market, taxes, 
immigration, law enforcement and the environment that were repeatedly asked in Danish National 
Election Studies. Three of them tap into attitudes towards economic issues: 
Politics should achieve the same economic conditions for everybody irrespective of 
education and occupation. (1 agree completely, 2 agree partly, 3 neither/nor, 4 
disagree partly, 5 disagree completely) 
 
A says: Private businesses and industry should, to a larger degree, have the right to 
make decisions regarding their own businesses. 
B says: The state should control private businesses. Under no circumstances should 
public control be less than it is in the Denmark of today. (1 agree with A, 2 agree 
with B, 3 neither A nor B) 
 
Higher incomes ought to be taxed more than is the case today. (1 agree completely, 2 
agree partly, 3 neither/nor, 4 disagree partly, 5 disagree completely) 
 
The other three tap into respondents’ attitudes towards cultural issues and have a common 
introduction:  
 
We’d like to hear your views on some important political issues. Could you tell me 
whether you agree or disagree with each of the following proposals? How strongly do 
you feel? 
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Immigration constitutes a serious threat to our national culture. (1 agree completely, 2 
agree partly, 3 neither/nor, 4 disagree partly, 5 disagree completely) 
 
Violent felony should be punished more strongly than is the case today. (1 agree 
completely, 2 agree partly, 3 neither/nor, 4 disagree partly, 5 disagree completely) 
 
Economic growth must be maintained by further development of industry even if this 
comes at the expense of environmental interests. (1 agree completely, 2 agree partly, 3 
neither/nor, 4 disagree partly, 5 disagree completely) 
 
All items have been consistently included in Danish Election Studies since the mid-1980s and were 
recoded into two five-point scales ranging from 1 “agree with all pro-government 
intervention/culturally liberal positions” to 5 “agree with all free market/culturally conservative 
positions” to measure economic liberalism (M=2.84, SD=1.10) and cultural conservatism (M=3.26, 
SD=1.07). The earlier election studies only contained two of these items. In this case, the 
calculation of the scales was adapted. In other cases, it was possible to use similar items to capture 
the respective attitudes (see the Online Appendix for details). This is mainly the case for attitudes 
towards immigration/immigrants, where the early surveys included items on attitudes towards guest 
workers and not immigration as a cultural threat. 
The scales for issue attitudes were then interacted with elite salience (Hypotheses 2 and 3) and 
mainstream and niche party polarization (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 4) to inspect whether the 
effect of cultural liberalism/conservatism increases with the rising importance of cultural issues 
among Danish political elites. The models also include controls for age, social class, education, sex 
and union membership. 
 
19 
Analysis 
The impact of issue attitudes on vote choice across elite salience 
As a first step, I inspect Carmines and Stimson’s argument on issue-based realignments; that is, 
whether the new dimension of conflict provoked enough emotional response to change party 
affiliations in Denmark. To reiterate, I expect that “Issue attitudes on the new dimension of conflict 
among the voters have a stronger effect on party choice the more salient the cultural dimension has 
become on the elite level” (Hypothesis 2) and “Issue attitudes on the new dimension of conflict 
matter more for the choice of niche parties than for the choice of mainstream parties” (Hypothesis 
3). I test these hypotheses by interacting the mass issue scales on economic liberalism and cultural 
conservatism with elite issue salience of the economy and culture. Table 1 presents the conditional 
effects of issue attitudes across the level of elite issue salience on vote choice for the four selected 
party contrasts using multilevel logit models with election years as macro-level to capture the 
clustering of individuals within election studies.6 The party contrasts represent one mainstream 
party contrast first (Social Democrats vs. Liberals), two mainstream against niche contrasts (Social 
Democrats vs. New Right; Liberals vs. SF), and finally a niche party contrast (SF vs. New Right).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The interaction elite salience culture*cultural conservatism is significant for all four party contrasts 
and always in favor of the two right-wing parties vis-à-vis their left competitors. The Liberals and 
the New Right attracted more culturally conservative voters the more Danish politics was about 
cultural issues. This supports Hypothesis 2 postulating that increased elite salience of cultural issues 
strengthens the effect of cultural conservatism on vote choice in Denmark. The difference between 
the interaction for the niche party contrast New Right vs. SF (0.139) and the respective mainstream 
party contrast Liberals vs. Social Democrats (0.079) is also significant at p<.05 which corroborates 
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Hypotheses 3 that cultural conservatism matters more for the choice of niche parties than for the 
choice of mainstream parties. This is further supported by looking at the other measures for elite 
salience and elite polarization in Table 1. Most of the significant elite salience and elite polarization 
measures occur for the contrast New Right vs. SF in the right-hand column, while there are only 
two significant elite effects for the contrast Social Democrats vs. Liberals in the left-hand column. 
To give an illustration of the effect sizes, I visualize the marginal effects of the interaction 
terms from the models in Table 1 given the not-always-straightforward interpretation of coefficients 
and p-values in logit models containing interactions (Brambor et al. 2006). I report both the effects 
for economic liberalism and cultural conservatism to allow a comparison of the effect strengths of 
the traditional and new dimension of partisan conflict in Denmark. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Figure 4 shows that the effects of economic liberalism and cultural conservatism on 
vote choice increase with the salience of the respective issue dimension. Moreover, cultural 
conservatism has a stronger effect if cultural issues dominate the parliamentary agenda compared to 
the same effect for economic issues (the interaction term with culture is significantly stronger than 
the interaction term with economy at p<.05 for all four party contrasts, see Table 1 and Tables A2-
A5).7 Again, the effect of being culturally conservative increases with the salience of cultural 
issues, and the effects consistently boost support for the two right-wing parties vis-à-vis their left 
opponents.  
Particularly, the impact of being culturally conservative increases somewhat stronger for the 
contrasts involving the New Right compared to the contrasts involving the Liberals, even though 
the differences in effect strengths are not very strong. The marginal effect of cultural conservatism 
on the probability of supporting the New Right vis-à-vis the Social Democrats is around 2-3 
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percentage points when the salience of cultural issues was at its minimum. This marginal effect of 
cultural conservatism on voting for the New Right vis-à-vis the Social Democrats increases to 
around 26 percentage points when cultural issues reach their empirical maximum (party contrasts 
on the upper right-hand side). The respective marginal effect on voting for the Liberals is 20 
percentage points in comparison with the Social Democrats and around 12 percentage points in 
comparison with the Socialist People’s Party (party contrasts on the left-hand side) – again with the 
salience of culture at its maximum.  
Together with the coefficients from Table 1, these marginal effects confirm Hypothesis 2 
because the significantly increasing electoral effects of conservative attitudes on culture result from 
the intensified party competition around cultural issues.8 Furthermore, the results confirm 
Hypothesis 3 since the marginal effects were stronger for party contrasts involving niche parties and 
strongest for the contrast New Right vs. SF. Danish partisans increasingly based their vote choice 
on cultural attitudes the more salient these issues became in Danish politics, signalling new policy 
alignments (Carmines and Stimson 1989: 161). 
 
The impact of issue attitudes on vote choice across polarization 
Having shown that the impact of policy issues on vote choice increases with their salience, the 
second step is to illustrate how the increasing polarization of cultural issues contributes to the 
understanding of vote choice and realignments within the Danish electorate since 1971 (Hypothesis 
1 and Hypothesis 4). To do this, I used the vote choice and the vote recall question from the last 
parliamentary election to create two measures of partisan realignment (and sorting). The first 
captures the realignment of voters with the New Right (Danish People’s Party/Progress Party) – the 
driving force and main winner of the issue evolution process in Denmark. This variable has three 
categories 0 "Did not realign with New Right, voted other party in both elections" 1 "Stayed with 
New Right, voted for them in both elections" 2 "Realigned with New Right, has voted other party in 
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election before”. The rationale is to inspect whether elite polarization on culture makes voters with 
culturally conservative attitudes more likely to (re-)align with the New Right. Moreover, it allows 
inspecting whether there is a sorting procedure as voters with culturally conservative positions 
should have an increasing propensity to keep voting the New Right as elites get more polarized on 
this dimension. As second measure, I captured voter migration from the left-wing to the right-wing 
bloc between two elections.9 This variable has four categories 0 "stayed within left bloc" 1 "stayed 
within right bloc" 2 "realigned with left" 3 "realigned with right", where only the latter two are 
presented in the analysis that follows. To reiterate, the right-wing parties had broken the structural 
majority of the social democrats and the other leftist parties after the 1973 Earthquake Election. If 
this is the consequence of an issue evolution process, then we should observe an increasing effect of 
cultural conservatism on the likelihood of realigning with the right bloc the stronger the niche 
parties polarize on culture. 
The models have a similar setup as the models above and include interactions elite 
polarization on culture*cultural conservatism (the five point scale described above).10 The 
interactions first test whether the effect of niche party polarization is systematically stronger than 
the effect of mainstream party polarization (Hypothesis 1). Second, they test whether the impact of 
attitudes on voting behaviour changes in response to the polarisation of parties and thus the 
resulting clarity of issues (see Carmines and Woods 2002 for a similar setup). If Hypothesis 4 is 
true, then we should see increasing marginal effects of cultural conservatism on realigning and 
sticking with the New Right and the right-wing bloc, the more niche parties polarize on culture. I 
again present the marginal effects of cultural conservatism across the observed polarization of 
mainstream and niche parties in the period under review (the coefficients appear in the Online 
Appendix, Tables A6-A7). 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
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Figure 5 presents the marginal effect of cultural conservatism on staying with other parties, 
realigning with the New Right and staying with the New Right across the observed polarization on 
culture for mainstream and niche parties. The left-hand panel reveals that mainstream party 
polarization on culture does only very mildly increase the effect of cultural conservatism on New 
Right alignment. The effect of being culturally conservative on shifting to or staying with the New 
Right is always positive, but does not strongly increase as mainstream parties do take more distant 
positions on culture. 
This differs when we look on the right-hand side, where we can clearly observe an increasing 
effect of cultural conservatism on realigning and staying with the New Right as niche parties take 
more distinct positions cultural issues. The likelihood that a culturally conservative voter keeps 
voting the New Right is only increased by one to two percent if niche party polarization on culture 
is low, but increases to eight percent if niche party polarization is at its maximum. This means that 
conservative voters stay with the New Right if party competition is centered around on culture – an 
indirect proof of a sorting procedure among Danish voters. Moreover, the chance of switching to 
the New Right when moving one unit on the cultural conservatism scale is below one percent when 
niche party polarization is below zero, but increases to more than three percent if niche parties have 
fully polarized on the new dimension (56 points distance in Figure 5). This difference is also 
significant at p<.05. Hence, niche party polarization conditioned the effect of cultural conservatism 
on realignment as voters with conservative attitudes sorted themselves into the New Right the 
stronger niche parties polarized the new dimension of conflict. 
An even clearer pattern occurs when looking at the voter migration between the left-wing and 
right-wing bloc of parties. 
 
 [Figure 6 about here] 
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Again, mainstream party polarization on the new dimension does not increase the effect of cultural 
conservatism on shifting from the left to the right bloc (and vice versa). The effect of cultural 
conservatism on defecting from a left to a right party is not surprisingly always positive, but does 
not increase as mainstream parties distance themselves on cultural issues (left-hand side of Figure 
6). This is different on the right-hand of Figure 6, where the effect of cultural conservatism on right-
wing realignment increases the stronger niche parties polarize the cultural dimension. The effect of 
cultural conservatism on right-wing realignment is even negative as long as niche party polarization 
has negative values meaning that the SF was more conservative than the Progress Party (as the SF 
was against wage competition with immigration in its early days). This changes as the Progress 
Party and later Danish People’s Party took more conservative positions. The effect of cultural 
conservatism on realigning with the right-wing bloc gets significantly stronger the stronger the 
niche parties polarize. A fully polarized cultural dimension increases the effect of conservatism on 
defecting to the right-wing bloc by around 1.5 percent. Another notable finding is that there is no 
significant negative effect of cultural conservatism on realigning with the left-wing bloc since the 
confidence intervals always include zero. Accordingly, cultural liberalism has not increased the 
likelihood of shifting to the left, because the respective marginal effect is never significant. Second, 
it means that niche party polarization on culture has been one driving force for bereaving the left of 
its structural majority from the pre-1973 party system as postulated in Hypothesis 4. Niche party 
polarization on culture has moved culturally conservative voters from the left to the right bloc, 
whereas the left could not equally compensate this by pulling culturally liberal voters from the right 
bloc. The results from the analysis on voter migration therefore demonstrate how issue evolution 
induced by niche parties has contributed to the decline of the left in Denmark and the strengthening 
of the right in the post-1973 party system. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the realignment processes around new cultural issues in the Danish multiparty 
system in 1971-2011. While previous analyses of issue evolution and realignments had been limited 
to two party-systems, this paper applied Carmines and Stimson’s theory on party system 
transformation and electoral change to a multiparty system. I argued that electoral change under 
multiparty competition is not driven by mainstream parties, as is in a two-party system, but by niche 
(and mainly new) parties who face a different incentive structure than mainstream parties in 
competing on and polarizing a new issue dimension. 
The results demonstrated that Carmines and Stimson’s (1986, 1989) model of issue evolution 
travels to a multidimensional multiparty system, when it is refined to describe the role of niche 
party competitors. Realignment in the Danish electorate was a consequence of increasing niche 
party polarization on cultural issues (and accompanied by depolarization on economic issues). 
Furthermore, niche party polarization has also driven the salience of the new issue dimension, to 
which partisans then reacted by aligning their preferences (see Arndt 2016). In line with Carmines 
and Stimson’s model, my models demonstrated that elite polarization on cultural issues 
strengthened the impact of cultural issues on vote choice, because culturally conservative voters 
increasingly aligned with the right-wing parties. 
This had also consequences for the balance of power in the Danish party system. Similar to 
the rise of the GOP at the expense of the Democratic party in the U.S. in the post-1964 party 
system, the emergence of a new dimension of conflict changed the balance of power in Denmark 
and bereaved the Social Democrats their dominant position. While the Danish Social Democrats 
could govern from 1953 to 1982 with only two short-term center-right governments in between 
(1968-71 and 1973-75), the majority of governments in Denmark in the post-1973 party system was 
formed by the center-right. On that score, four out of the last five governments in Denmark have 
been right-wing governments formed by the Liberals, who could capitalize on the realignment 
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induced by the New Right after the 1983 immigration law and the Liberals’ own adoption of 
culturally conservative positions in the late 1990s. Consequently, niche party polarization accounts 
for issue-based realignments in Denmark after 1973, as the strong emotional reactions around issues 
like immigration or crime fundamentally reshaped the electoral landscape. 
Thus, one important implication of this analysis is that the emergence of cultural conflicts, as 
demonstrated by Kriesi et al. (2008), is not only a bottom-up process, where elites react to attitudes 
among the mass public. Rather, strategic considerations by niche party elites to compete on new 
issue dimensions have contributed to the restructuring of the electoral landscape in many Western 
countries with multiparty systems. Here, mainstream parties have trailed behind their niche party 
competitors in adapting their positions to the new issue dimension. While this paper adopted 
Carmines and Stimson’s model to the issue evolution processes under multiparty competition, there 
are various obvious issues for future research on issue evolution under multiparty competition to 
examine in order to substantiate my findings. 
First, Layman and Carsey (2002) have asked how much of the issue evolution process in the 
United States can be attributed to conflict extension; that is, a reinforcement of already existing 
partisan cleavages by new issues that increase the leverage of pre-existing issue divides on voting. 
Conflict extension might be weaker in a multiparty system since a new issue dimension of conflict 
can be more independent of the traditional dimension of conflict when the choice set is not limited 
to two parties and mainstream parties still mobilize a considerable number of voters through their 
positions on the “old” dimension of competition. On the other hand, it might well be that issues 
such as welfare benefits get increasingly connected to immigration as in the U.S. This is a topic to 
be examined by future research, preferably using panel data containing items on political 
awareness, knowledge and party identification, which was not possible in the present analysis due 
to data limitations. 
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A second issue for future research is the role of elite cues in the issue evolution process in 
multiparty systems. One obvious limitation of the present study is the focus on elite polarization 
and voting behavior, while the effects of elite cues on the new dimension of conflict and party 
identification were left out. The relationship between partisanship, elite cues and opinion formation 
might be less straightforward in a multiparty setup, where niche party competitors do not have a 
strong supporter base with strong levels of party identification at the beginning of the issue 
evolution and sorting process. Rather, partisanship might be built up consecutively after niche party 
elites have sent cues to the electorate, and after the respective issue attitudes have turned into votes 
for niche party competitors. This can inspected by panel analysis tapping into the effects of niche 
party cues vis-à-vis mainstream party cues on party identification. 
Third, future research might identify the conditions under which niche parties’ and issue 
entrepreneurs’ cues fail to evoke an issue evolution. Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002) have 
analyzed culture war issues that failed to produce a response at the mass level in the United States. 
There might be similar issues under multiparty competition where new parties fail to produce a 
lasting response among the broader public even though the entry of new issues and issue 
entrepreneurs is principally easier here. One current example is the different success of the Pirate 
Party and the AfD in Germany. Both new parties started with some spectacular success at state 
elections in 2011-2014. However, only the AfD has had lasting success with a conservative 
platform around immigration, crime, and culture, while the Pirate Party could not mobilize voters 
persistingly with its vaguer platform around digital democracy, transparency, privacy, and 
copyrights. This likely relates to the distinction between easy issues that have the potential for an 
issue evolution and those ‘hard’ issues that fail to provoke enough salience (Carmines & Stimson 
1989: 11-12). Accordingly, further applications of the issue evolution perspective could tap into 
macro- and micro-level factors that distinguish successful issue evolution from unsuccessful 
attempts. 
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Notes  
1 The Conservative Party was larger than the Liberals during the 1980s, but as these two center-right parties usually 
form coalitions together I have excluded the Conservatives given the limited value added. 
2 This measure has been validated by Bakker and Hobolt (2013: 34ff) since the parties’ positions on the two dimensions 
correspond very closely to expert judgements from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey as well as party placements from 
Eurobarometer surveys. 
3 The picture is even clearer when using the parties’ positions on immigration (see Figure A2 in the Online Appendix). 
4 Analyses of the perceived party positions on the economy and culture shows that partisans were aware of the strong 
polarization of niche parties on culture and the convergence of most parties on economic issues by the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (Arndt 2016). 
5 Data is available at the Danish Data Archive (https://www.sa.dk/en/services/danish-data-archive). I excluded the 1988 
election given it was a snap election to consolidate a right-wing coalition government and the rather limited data for 
elite salience in the very short term 1987-88. Accordingly, I treated the years 1987-1990 as one election period for the 
elite-level data. 
6 All models have be rerun in GLLAMM as multinomial specifications that also included the Social Liberals, the 
Conservatives, and the various center parties. The results yield very similar conclusions and are available on request.  
7 The results are similar if using a measure of salience at the individual level instead of elite salience; see the robustness 
check in Figure A3 in the Online Appendix. 
8 Replacing the scales on attitudes with single items on taxes/redistribution and immigration yields similar findings (see 
Figure A4 in the Online Appendix). The same goes when replacing elite salience on the two dimensions with the 
parties’ positions on culture and economy (robustness check available on request) 
9 The left-wing bloc contains the Social Democrats, the SF, the Social Liberals, the various radical left parties, while the 
right-wing bloc contains the Liberals, the Danish People’s Party/Progress Party, the Conservatives, and the various 
center parties. I adjusted for bloc affiliation in those years, where center parties cooperated with the left parties and not 
the right. 
10 The marginal effects shown here are based on multinomial logit models with robust standard errors. The results for 
the realignment models are very similar to multilevel multinomial logit models ran in GLLAMM (available on request).  
 
Supplementary material and replication data for this article is available with the manuscript on the PRQ 
website. 
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Table 1: Effects of economic liberalism, cultural conservatism, and elite issue salience on vote choice for four selected party contrasts 
Party positions and political attitudes M1: Social Democrats  
vs. Liberals 
M2: Social Democrats  
vs. New Right 
M3: Liberals  
vs. Socialist People’s Party 
M4: Socialist People’s Party 
vs. New Right 
 Economic 
liberalism 
Cultural 
conservatism 
Economic 
liberalism 
Cultural 
conservatism 
Economic 
liberalism 
Cultural 
conservatism 
Economic 
liberalism 
Cultural 
conservatism 
Distance Liberals-Social Democrats 
on economy 
0.019* 0.016 -0.005 -0.005 -0.044*** -0.039*** 0.021** 0.024*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Distance Liberals-Social Democrats 
on culture 
0.003 0.011 -0.004 0.001 -0.014* -0.035* 0.012 0.021* 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) 
Distance New Right-SF on economy -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.027*** -0.028* 0.036*** 0.040*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
Distance New Right-SF on culture -0.010 -0.008 0.006 0.008 -0.005 -0.006 0.027*** 0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
Elite salience of economic issues 0.104 0.076 -0.071 0.019 -0.169*** -0.140 -0.043 0.117** 
 (0.076) (0.071) (0.075) (0.066) (0.050) (0.085) (0.064) (0.043) 
Elite salience of cultural issues 0.216** -0.079 0.120 -0.347*** -0.305*** 0.023 0.237*** -0.232** 
 (0.078) (0.085) (0.074) (0.088) (0.035) (0.105) (0.047) (0.080) 
Economic liberalism scale 1.191*** 1.187*** 0.308** 0.745*** -1.738*** -1.697*** 0.482** 1.084*** 
 (0.095) (0.036) (0.117) (0.046) (0.146) (0.062) (0.183) (0.075) 
Salience of economic 
issues*Economic liberalism scale 
-0.001  0.039***  0.009  0.057***  
(0.008)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.016)  
Cultural conservatism scale 0.856*** -0.507*** 1.395*** -0.664** -1.454*** 0.394 1.906*** -0.473 
 (0.036) (0.153) (0.055) (0.215) (0.058) (0.249) (0.083) (0.303) 
Salience of cultural issues*Cultural 
conservatism scale 
 0.079***  0.118***  -0.106***  0.139*** 
 (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.018) 
Constant -11.596*** -6.356** -8.840*** -1.892 18.461*** 12.808*** -15.746*** -10.002*** 
 (2.347) (2.402) (2.233) (2.310) (1.183) (2.917) (1.548) (1.767) 
N 7,694 7,694 5,408 5,408 5,103 5,103 2,817 2,817 
-2loglikelihood -3,907.88 -3,867.25 -2,140.05 -2,105.69 -1,675.34 -1,649.89 -914.46 -893.31 
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.68 
Entries are logit coefficients from multilevel logit models of party choice with first-mentioned party as reference category and standard errors in parentheses;* p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; *** p<0.001. See Tables A2-A5 in online appendix for full documentation. Source: Danish Election Studies 1971-2011, CMP data and Danish Policy Agenda 
Project. 
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Fig. 1 Issue salience among Danish elite: Difference economic – cultural issues, 1968-2015. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Danish Policy Agenda Project. 
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Fig. 2 Polarization of Danish parties on economic issues, 1968-2011. 
 
Note: Lines are smoothed. Source: Own calculations based on Comparative Manifesto Project.  
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Fig. 3 Polarization of Danish parties on cultural issues, 1968-2011. 
 
Note: Lines are smoothed. Source: Own calculations based on Comparative Manifesto Project.
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Fig. 4 Marginal effects of economic liberalism and cultural conservatism on party choice over salience of economic and cultural issues among the elite. 
 
 
Note: The marginal effects are calculated based on M1a-M4b from Table 1 and Tables A2-A5 in the online appendix. Positive values indicate a higher probability to 
vote the second-mentioned party for each party contrast.
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Fig. 5 Marginal effects of cultural conservatism on realignment with New Right over mainstream and niche party 
polarization. 
 
Note: The marginal effects are calculated based on M5 from Table A6 in the online appendix. 
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Fig. 6 Marginal effects of cultural conservatism on realignment with left/right bloc over mainstream and niche party 
polarization. 
 
Note: The marginal effects are calculated based on M6 from Table A7 in the online appendix. 
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